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This is the ninth in a series of volumes on the economics of aging. The pre-
vious ones were The Economics of Aging, Issues in the Economics of Aging,
Topics in the Economics of Aging, Studies in the Economics of Aging, Ad-
vances in the Economics of Aging, Inquiries in the Economics of Aging, Fron-
tiers in the Economics of Aging, and Themes in the Economics of Aging.
Most of the papers in this volume pursue areas of research begun in ear-
lier volumes. For example, the work in this volume emphasizes the spread
of personal retirement accounts and macrodata on the implications of the
diﬀusion of these accounts. Prior work emphasized the net saving eﬀects 
of personal retirement accounts based on microdata. Work in this volume
also revisits the implications of housing wealth for the ﬁnancing of general
consumption as households age. The current work conﬁrms previous ﬁnd-
ings that households typically do not withdraw equity from housing to ﬁ-
nance general consumption, but such withdrawal is more likely when a
spouse dies or enters a nursing home. In addition to discussion of the per-
sonal retirement plans and home equity, the ﬁrst ﬁve papers in this volume
consider other aspects of wealth accumulation and compare asset accu-
mulation in the United States and the United Kingdom.
Trying to understand the explanation for the very strong relationship be-
tween health and wealth is one of the most challenging research issues in
the economics of aging. Perhaps the most vexing issue that arises in this
analysis is the direction of causality. Is it from health to wealth or from
wealth to health, or perhaps both? There have been several papers on this
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Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, and the director for Health and Re-
tirement Programs at the National Bureau of Economic Research.issue in past volumes. The next six papers in this volume continue analysis
of several aspects of the relationship between health and wealth, with the
general aim of advancing our understanding of the reasons for the rela-
tionship. The analyses include consideration of the decline in mortality in
the United States and the United Kingdom and the relationship between
medical care and mortality. The relationship between pension income and
health in South Africa also contributes to our understanding of the
health–wealth relationship. This volume also includes more formal discus-
sion of econometric methodology to determine the direction of causality.
This introduction provides a summary of the papers and draws heavily on
the authors’ own language.
Personal Retirement Plans
Implications of the Transition to Personal Accounts
Retirement saving in the United States has changed dramatically over
the last two decades. There has been a shift from employer-managed de-
ﬁned beneﬁt pensions to deﬁned contribution retirement saving plans that
are largely controlled by employees. In 1980, 92 percent of private retire-
ment saving contributions were to employer-based plans, and 64 percent of
these contributions were to deﬁned beneﬁt plans. Today, about 85 percent
of private contributions are to plans in which individuals decide how much
to contribute to the plan, how to invest plan assets, and how and when to
withdraw money from the plan. In “The Transition to Personal Accounts
and Increasing Retirement Wealth: Macro- and Microevidence,” James M.
Poterba, Steven F. Venti, and I use both macro- and microdata to describe
the change in retirement assets and in retirement saving. We give particu-
lar attention to the possible substitution of pension assets in one plan for
assets in another plan, such as the substitution of 401(k) assets for deﬁned
beneﬁt plan assets.
Aggregate data show that between 1975 and 1999 assets to support re-
tirement increased about ﬁvefold relative to wage and salary income. This
increase suggests large increases in the wealth of future retirees. The enor-
mous increase in deﬁned contribution plan assets dwarfed any potential
displacement of deﬁned beneﬁt plan assets. In addition, in recent years the
annual retirement plan contribution rate, deﬁned as retirement plan contri-
butions as a percentage of National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA)
personal income, has been over 5 percent. This is much higher than the
NIPA total personal saving rate, which has been close to zero.
Retirement saving as a share of personal income today would likely be at
least one percentage point greater had it not been for legislation in the
1980s that limited employer contributions to deﬁned beneﬁt pension plans
and the reduction in deﬁned beneﬁt plan contributions associated with the
2D a vid A. Wiserising stock market of the 1990s. It is also likely that the retirement plan
contribution rate would be much higher today if it were not for the 1986 re-
trenchment of the Individual Retirement Account (IRA) program.
Rising retirement plan contributions, as well as favorable rates of return
on retirement plan assets in the 1990s, explain the large increase in these as-
sets relative to income. Employee retirement saving under a deﬁned con-
tribution plan is easily measured and quite transparent to the employee.
On the other hand, annual employee saving under a deﬁned beneﬁt plan is
more diﬃcult to measure. It is also less likely to be clearly understood by
employees. The average annual saving rate under a typical 401(k) plan is
roughly twice as high as the average saving rate under a typical deﬁned ben-
eﬁt plan, when properly measured. In addition, the early retirement incen-
tives inherent in the provisions of most deﬁned beneﬁt plans will tend to
reduce the aggregate accumulation of deﬁned beneﬁt retirement assets
relative to deﬁned contribution assets because deﬁned contribution partic-
ipants are likely to work longer and contribute for more years.
The microdata show no evidence that the accumulation of 401(k) assets
has been oﬀset by a reduction in deﬁned beneﬁt assets. Because annual sav-
ing is much greater under 401(k) than under deﬁned beneﬁt plans, assets at
retirement after lifetime employment under a 401(k) plan typically would
be much higher than under a deﬁned beneﬁt plan. In addition, a large frac-
tion of new 401(k) enrollees retained deﬁned beneﬁt coverage, which prob-
ably further increased their retirement saving.
The Importance of Plan Features
In the last several years, dozens of employers have automatically en-
rolled new employees in the company 401(k) plan. Employees can opt out
of the 401(k), but few choose to do so. In “For Better or for Worse: Default
Eﬀects and 401(k) Savings Behavior,” James J. Choi, David Laibson,
Brigitte C. Madrian and Andrew Metrick analyze three years of 401(k)
data from two ﬁrms that have experimented with automatic enrollment.
They ﬁnd that automatic enrollment has a dramatic impact on retirement
savings behavior.
Under automatic enrollment (also called negative election), employees
are automatically enrolled in their company’s 401(k) plan unless the em-
ployee elects to opt out of plan participation. This contrasts with the usual
arrangement in which employees actively elect to participate in their em-
ployer’s 401(k) plan.
The institution of automatic enrollment manipulates the way the savings
decision is framed. In theory, the existence of automatic enrollment should
not inﬂuence the employee’s decision; automatic enrollment doesn’t
change the economic fundamentals of the planning problem. But auto-
matic enrollment nonetheless increases participation in 401(k) plans. Opt-
ing out requires workers to actively make a decision and then act on that
Introduction 3decision. It is easier to follow the path of least resistance and passively ac-
cept the default.
Choi, Laibson, Madrian, and Metrick ﬁnd that automatic enrollment
has a dramatic impact on participation rates. Under automatic enrollment,
401(k) participation rates exceed 85 percent regardless of the tenure of the
employee. In the absence of automatic enrollment, employees exhibit par-
ticipation rates of only 25 percent after six months of tenure and 60 per-
cent after three years at the ﬁrm.
They also ﬁnd that automatic enrollment has a dramatic impact on sav-
ings rates and asset allocation choices. Under automatic enrollment, ap-
proximately 80 percent of plan participants save at the default saving rate
and invest exclusively in the default fund. This percentage declines slowly
over time, falling to 50 percent after two or three years of tenure.
Automatic enrollment encourages participation, but it anchors partici-
pants at a low savings rate and in a conservative investment vehicle. Higher
participation raises average wealth accumulation, but low savings rates
and conservative investments undercut accumulation. In the sample, the
two eﬀects are roughly oﬀsetting. Controlling for income and tenure, they
compare total 401(k) balances for employees who joined the ﬁrm before
automatic enrollment and employees who joined the ﬁrm after automatic
enrollment. They ﬁnd that automatic enrollment has a positive impact on
long-run wealth accumulation in one of the ﬁrms and no impact on long-
run wealth accumulation in the other ﬁrm.
Although automatic enrollment does not have a dramatic impact on the
mean level of balances, it does have a large impact on the distribution of
balances. The high participation rate associated with automatic enroll-
ment drastically reduces the fraction of employees with zero balances,
thereby thinning out the bottom tail of the distribution of employee bal-
ances. In addition, anchoring on low savings rates and conservative invest-
ments sometimes shrinks the upper tail of the distribution of balances.
Hence, automatic enrollment reduces the variance of wealth accumulation
across all employees.
The Financial Implications of Housing Equity as People Age
Home equity is the principle asset of a large fraction of elderly Ameri-
cans and can have important implications for the well-being of elderly
households. In “Aging and Housing Equity: Another Look,” Steven F.
Venti and I have used Health and Retirement Study (HRS) and Asset and
Health Dynamics Among the Oldest Old (AHEAD) panel data, as well as
Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) data, to understand
the change in the home equity of households as they age. We give particu-
lar attention to the relationship between changes in home equity and
changes in household structure.
There are two ways for households to change home equity: by discon-
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ﬁnd that, overall, households are unlikely to discontinue home ownership.
Ownership terminations are most likely to occur following the death of a
spouse or the entry of a family member into a nursing home. But, even in
these circumstances, selling the home is the exception and not the rule. In
the absence of a precipitating shock, it is much more likely that a family will
sell and buy a new home than discontinue ownership. And households that
sell and buy again tend to increase rather than reduce home equity. That is,
assets are transferred to housing.
Overall—combining the eﬀects of discontinuing ownership and moving
to another home—we ﬁnd that housing equity of HRS households in-
creases with age, and the equity of AHEAD households declines some-
what. The overall decline in the housing equity of the older AHEAD
households is about 1.76 percent per year, which is accounted for prima-
rily by a 7.84 percent decline among households experiencing precipitat-
ing shocks to family status. Families that remain intact reduce housing eq-
uity very little, only 0.11 percent per year for two-person households and
1.15 percent per year for one-person households.
We use two approaches to determine whether households wish to reduce
home equity as they age. One approach is to compare the change in the
home equity of movers with the change for stayers. If households withdraw
equity when they sell and move to a new home, the reduction in the equity
of the movers typically will be greater than the change for stayers. These
comparisons, however, are confounded by the tendency of the self-assessed
home values to exceed actual values, as measured by selling prices. A com-
parison of the selling prices of homes with the prior self-assessment of
home values shows that home values reported prior to a sale far exceed re-
alized sales prices. Comparing the change in the home equity of movers
and stayers, but accounting for this bias, we conclude that families who sell
and buy a new home increase home equity on average.
The second approach is based on the comparison of the selling price of
the old home (minus the mortgage on the home) with the reported equity
value in the newly purchased home. We believe that these are the most re-
liable data on the change in home equity when families move from one
home to another. Based on these sale price data, we ﬁnd that on average
households increase home equity when they move to a new house. We also
ﬁnd, however, that equity-rich and income-poor families tend to reduce
home values when they sell and buy a new house, whereas equity-poor and
income-rich families tend to increase home equity. For continuing two-
person HRS households, for example, we estimate that the between-wave
reduction for those at the 80th equity quantile and at the 20th income
quantile is –$15,422. On the other hand, we estimate that households at 
the 20th equity quantile and the 80th income quantile increase equity by
 $54,778.
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enough to maintain their preretirement standard of living after retirement,
housing equity should not, in general, be counted on to support nonhous-
ing consumption. Families apparently do not intend to ﬁnance general re-
tirement consumption by saving through investment in housing, as they
might through a 401(k) plan or through some other ﬁnancial form of sav-
ing. Rather, we believe the ﬁndings here, as well as our earlier ﬁndings, sug-
gest that families purchase homes to provide an environment in which to
live, even as they age through retirement years. In this case, the typical ag-
ing household is unlikely to seek a reverse annuity mortgage to withdraw
assets from home equity. It may be appropriate, however, to think of hous-
ing as a reserve or buﬀer that can be used in catastrophic circumstances
that result in a change in household structure. In this case, having used the
home equity along the way—through a reverse mortgage, for example—
would defeat the purpose of saving home equity for a rainy day.
Although these results are based largely on new HRS and AHEAD data
ﬁles and are based on diﬀerent methods of analysis, the ﬁndings corre-
spond closely to the conclusions we reached in our earlier papers, based on
diﬀerent data sources. These conclusions also correspond closely to the
ﬁndings of a recent survey of older households sponsored by the American
Association of Retired Persons (AARP), showing that the preponderance
of older families agree with the statement: What I’d really like to do is stay
in my current residence as long as possible. Like our ﬁndings, the results of
the AARP survey also imply that most households do not intend to liqui-
date housing equity to support general nonhousing retirement consump-
tion as they age.
How Is Wealth Accumulated?
Economists generally agree that there are two possible sources of house-
hold wealth: households can engage in life-cycle saving by not consuming
all of their income, or they can receive bequests or inter vivos transfers
from individuals outside of their household. For at least two decades, how-
ever, there has been an ongoing debate about the relative magnitude of
these two sources of wealth.
In “Intergenerational Transfers and Savings Behavior,” Jeﬀrey R. Brown
and Scott J. Weisbenner present further evidence of the importance of
these two routes to wealth accumulation.
The source of household wealth is important for many reasons. The be-
havioral eﬀects of many government programs, such as Social Security, the
taxation of savings, and targeted savings programs, likely depend upon
the source of wealth. Debates about the fairness of the wealth distribution
in the United States, and the extent to which there is intergenerational
mobility across this distribution, depend on whether wealth is primarily
earned or inherited.
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Survey of Consumer Finances, they provide evidence suggesting that trans-
fer wealth accounts for approximately 20–25 percent of current household
net worth, suggesting a large role for life-cycle savings.
Second, the authors examine the variation in the size of transfers re-
ceived and expected. They ﬁnd that while in aggregate, transfer wealth
does not appear to be as large as some prior estimates suggest; it is impor-
tant for a small subset of the population. They ﬁnd that approximately one-
ﬁfth of households report receiving a transfer, and one-eighth expect a
substantial transfer in the future. For those households that have received
transfers, transfer wealth accounts for, on average, half of current net
worth. For lower-wealth households (those with less than $75,000), trans-
fer wealth on average exceeds current wealth.
Third, Brown and Weisbenner examine whether past transfers and ex-
pected future transfers cause people to save less from their labor income to
reduce life-cycle saving. They ﬁnd evidence that the receipt of transfers re-
duces life-cycle saving, with point estimates suggesting slightly less than
dollar-for-dollar crowd-out. But expected future transfers do not reduce
life-cycle saving, perhaps suggesting that a bird in hand is indeed worth
more than a bird in the bush.
Wealth at Retirement in the United States and the United Kingdom
The accumulation of personal wealth diﬀers substantially across coun-
tries. So does the distribution of wealth among assets. In “Wealth Portfo-
lios in the United Kingdom and the United States,” James Banks, Richard
Blundell, and James P. Smith discuss a “housing equity puzzle”: why do
younger households in the U.K. accumulate so much of their wealth in
housing equity compared to their U.S. counterparts?
In trying to address this puzzle the authors have built up a detailed pic-
ture of housing choices and wealth accumulation in both countries. Using
microdata sources, they document how the diﬀerence in housing equity has
evolved for diﬀerent age groups, for diﬀerent demographic groups, and for
diﬀerent education groups in both countries. They show that young adults
in the United Kingdom leave their parental home later than in the United
States, and when they do leave they are much more likely to accumulate
wealth in housing equity rather than in other investment instruments.
Why? Is it just the diﬀerential tax treatment of mortgages or the diﬀer-
ent institutional structures of the housing and stock markets in the two
countries? The authors argue that these diﬀerences explain some of the
diﬀerence in housing equity, but the higher volatility of house prices in the
United Kingdom is the key reason. They derive a modeling framework that
explains the higher price volatility in the United Kingdom and use the
model to explain the diﬀerences in housing equity and stock holdings
across the countries.
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households in the owner-occupier sector at an earlier age than in the
United States. The higher volatility of house prices in the United Kingdom
adds to this incentive because, for those expecting to move up the house-
size ladder, housing equity is an eﬃcient insurance vehicle for house-price
uncertainty. The only way to invest in housing equity is to become an
owner. Once an owner, this insurance mechanism increases the incentive to
hold a higher proportion of wealth in housing equity rather than in some
other asset. Where house prices are less volatile, as in the United States, this
incentive is much reduced. Consequently, as households age and wish to
accumulate wealth, they will do this more through housing equity in the
United Kingdom than in the United States.
Health and Wealth
A striking empirical regularity is the strong, positive relationship be-
tween wealth and health. Several papers discuss diﬀerent aspects of this re-
lationship and use diﬀerent methods to understand the relationship. The
last chapter in the volume presents formal methods to test for causal links
between socioeconomic status and health.
Mortality, Income, and Income Inequality
In both the United States and Britain, for both men and women and for
most age groups, there has been a very substantial decline in mortality
rates since 1950. In “Mortality, Income, and Income Inequality over Time
in Britain and the United States,” Angus Deaton and Christina Paxson use
cohort data from the two countries to understand the relationship between
income and the decline in mortality.
The comparison between the two countries is interesting in part because
of the diﬀerent systems of health care—one country with universal cover-
age and the other with private provision until Medicare coverage at age
sixty-ﬁve. Comparative analysis is also useful because there are both simi-
larities and diﬀerences in patterns of income in the two countries. Al-
though changes in income inequality are similar in Britain and the United
States, patterns of income growth are not. According to purchasing power
parity estimates, incomes are higher in the United States than in Britain,
but, in recent years, real incomes have been growing more rapidly in
Britain. Both countries experienced historically large increases in income
inequality in the 1980s.
In both Britain and the United States, for men and for women and for
most age groups, there has been a very substantial decline in mortality
rates since 1950. The authors’ examination of these rates, by sex and age
group and in relation to the evolution of incomes and income inequality,
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decline in mortality, or between income inequality and mortality rates. In
the United States, the period of slowest income growth saw substantial ac-
celerations in the rate of mortality decline, particularly among middle-
aged and older men and women. In both the United States and Britain, the
increase in income inequality took place at the same time as a deceleration
in mortality decline at the younger ages, including infant mortality. But
there are previously slow rates of decline when nothing was happening to
income inequality, and the later rise in income inequality was associated
with the acceleration in mortality decline among middle-aged and older
adults in both countries. Deaton and Paxson conclude that a more plaus-
ible account of the data is that, over time, declines in mortality are driven
by technological advances or by the emergence of new infectious diseases,
such as AIDS. These advances and retreats are associated with speciﬁc
conditions and speciﬁc treatments, and so aﬀect men and women diﬀer-
ently and diﬀerent age groups diﬀerently. They also happen ﬁrst in the
United States, with the British experience following with a lag of several
years. The authors say that this hypothesis needs a great deal more investi-
gation, for example, by looking at more countries.
Deaton and Paxson then compare these results with their prior analysis,
suggesting that if changes in mortality over time are driven by technology
and not by income, there must be some doubt as to whether their previous
analysis came to the correct conclusions about the role of cohort incomes
in the decline of cohort mortality. Their prior results cannot be replicated
on the British data. They suspect—but have not been able to demonstrate
decisively—that the cohort analysis is ﬂawed by the necessity to make the
almost certainly invalid assumption that age eﬀects in mortality are con-
stant through time. This is contradicted, for example, by the spread of
AIDS, which has almost certainly raised the early life relative to later life
mortality rates among recently born men and women compared with their
seniors. If this is a serious problem, the cohort method may not be useful
in this context, or it will at least require substantial modiﬁcations in order
to give sound results.
The authors conclude that this comparative international work is a pro-
ductive direction for future research. Even so, they say, there remains a ma-
jor puzzle about the role of income. Income growth seems to play little role
in decline of mortality at the national level. At the cohort level the same is
possibly true as they argue in this paper. Yet in the individual-level data
from the National Longitudinal Mortality Study, as from many other data
sets, income is protective against mortality, even when education and other
socioeconomic variables are controlled. Why there should be such a con-
trast between the individual and national eﬀects of income is a topic that
requires a good deal of further thought and analysis, the authors conclude.
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In “Does Money Protect Health Status? Evidence from South African
Pensions,” Anne Case approaches the relationship between health and
wealth by considering the eﬀect on health status of an exogenous increase
in income.
Case quantiﬁes the impact on health status of the large increase in in-
come associated with the South African state old age pension. Elderly
black and colored men and women who did not anticipate receiving large
pensions in their lifetimes, and who did pay into a pension system, are cur-
rently receiving more than twice median black income per capita. These
elderly men and women generally live in large (three, four, or ﬁve genera-
tion) households, and this paper documents the eﬀect of the pension on the
pensioners, on other adult members of their households, and on the chil-
dren who live with them. She ﬁnds, in households that pool income, that
the pension protects the health of all household members, working in part
to protect the nutritional status of household members, in part of improve
living conditions, and in part to reduce the stress under which the adult
household members negotiate day-to-day life. The health eﬀects of deliv-
ering cash provide a benchmark against which other health-related inter-
ventions can be evaluated, Case concludes.
Socioeconomic Status, Nutrition, and Health
Robert Jensen explores the relationship between “Socioeconomic Sta-
tus, Nutrition, and Health among the Elderly.”
In his paper, Jensen uses data from a nationally representative house-
hold-level survey to explore the relationship between health and socioeco-
nomic status (SES) for the elderly in Russia.
Jensen has two main objectives: ﬁrst, to explore the basic relationship,
which is valuable because there has been little evidence on the health-SES
relationship for transition economies; and second, to present evidence
from a variety of measures of health status, including measurements of
blood pressure, weight and height conducted by trained enumerators, as
well as nutrient intake, derived from twenty-four- and forty-eight-hour
food intake diaries. Jensen uses these data to show that the relationship be-
tween health and SES in Russia can’t be adequately described by simple
statements, such as the poor are less healthy than the rich; although on net
the rich are healthier than the poor in some overall sense, there are impor-
tant ways in which the rich face greater health risks.
In the study of the relationship between health and income, the biggest
challenge, Jensen says, is to decompose the health diﬀerentials into the root
causes. There are numerous channels through which the two could be linked.
Jensen narrows the focus to one particular mechanism—nutrition—
through which SES may aﬀect health. The role of nutrition as a factor in
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when examining middle- and upper-income countries, because widespread
hunger and starvation, even among the poorest, have largely been elimi-
nated and, in fact, widespread obesity is considered a greater public health
concern. However, nutrition must be viewed as more complex than hunger
or simply suﬃcient caloric intake. In particular, there are important micro-
nutrients beyond calories that are important for good health, especially for
the elderly. And the intake of these nutrients may be sensitive to income, as
the lowest cost staple foods in most countries (for example, bread or rice)
may yield suﬃcient ‘bulk’ or calories, but (unless fortiﬁed) may have low
levels of vitamins, minerals, and protein. On the other hand, these foods
tend to be low in fat, cholesterol, and sodium, compared with foods that
may be more expensive and eaten in larger quantities by the rich, for ex-
ample, meat. Therefore, Jensen concludes, it is quite possible that nutri-
tion plays a role in the relationship between health and SES, even in coun-
tries where calorie malnutrition is scarce and obesity is widespread.
Jensen uses data on food intake to provide a detailed analysis of nutrient
intake for the elderly, how it varies with income, the consequences of nu-
tritional intake for health, and the relationship between health and SES.
He does this by exploring diﬀerences in the diets of the rich and poor, how
diﬀerences in diet translate into diﬀerences in nutrient intake, and the im-
pact of nutrient intake on health.
Mortality
Mortality and Changes over the Twentieth Century
Mortality rates declined extremely rapidly in the United States over the
twentieth century, as they did in all developed countries. In 1900, 1 in 42
Americans died annually. On an age-adjusted basis, the share in 1998 was
1 in 125 people, for a cumulative decline of 67 percent. Given such a sub-
stantial improvement in mortality, it is natural to ask how we achieved such
gains in health and which innovations or policies contributed most to these
gains. David M. Cutler and Ellen Meara do this in “Changes in the Age
Distribution of Mortality over the Twentieth Century.”
Cutler and Meara start by considering major trends in mortality over
the century, noting how mortality declines diﬀer by age and cause of death.
By providing detailed information on which demographic groups experi-
enced the largest mortality improvements and for what causes of death,
these analyses motivate hypotheses to explain the overall improvement in
mortality in the twentieth century.
The mortality decline is approximately linear over the time period. Mor-
tality decreased at a relatively constant rate of 1 percent per year between
1900 and 1940. There was then a period of rapid decline from 1940 to 1955
Introduction 11in which mortality declined 2 percent per year, followed by essentially ﬂat
mortality rates until 1965. Since 1965, mortality rates have fallen at
roughly 1 to 1.5 percent per year. This relative constancy of mortality de-
cline suggests that perhaps a single factor can explain the trend in longer
life.
But the aggregate trends mask as much as they reveal. While mortality
declines have been relatively continuous over the twentieth century, the age
distribution of mortality decline has not. Cutler and Meara start by high-
lighting a basic fact about mortality declines in the past century: mortality
reduction used to be concentrated at younger ages but is increasingly con-
centrated among the aged. In the ﬁrst four decades of the century, 80 per-
cent of life expectancy improvements resulted from reduced mortality for
those below age forty-ﬁve, with the bulk of this for infants and children. In
the next two decades, life expectancy improvements were split relatively
evenly by age. In the latter four decades, about two-thirds of life expec-
tancy improvements resulted from mortality reductions for those over age
forty-ﬁve; only one-third was from the younger population.
This change has been accompanied by several important epidemiologi-
cal trends. Throughout the ﬁrst half of the twentieth century, infectious
diseases were the leading cause of death. Changes in the ability to avoid
and withstand infection were the prime factors in reduced mortality in the
ﬁrst part of the century. This disease-ﬁghting ability was not predomi-
nantly medical. Nutrition and public health measures were vastly more
important in reduced mortality over this time period than were medical
interventions, as substantial research documents. Nutrition and public
health were particularly important for the young, and so mortality reduc-
tion was concentrated at younger ages.
Between 1940 and 1960, infectious diseases continued to decline, but
was due more to medical factors. Antibiotics, including penicillin and sulfa
drugs, became important contributors to mortality reduction in this era.
Antibiotics help the elderly as well as the young, and so mortality reduc-
tions became more widespread across the age distribution.
Since 1960, mortality reductions have been associated with two new fac-
tors: the conquest of cardiovascular disease in the elderly and the preven-
tion of death due to low birth weight infants. While it is not entirely clear
what factors account for the reduction in cardiovascular disease mortality,
the traditional roles of nutrition, public health, and antibiotics are cer-
tainly less important, the authors conclude. Taking their place are factors
related to individual behaviors, such as smoking, diet, and high-tech med-
ical treatment. Cutler and Meara term this change the medicalization of
death: Increasingly, mortality reductions are attributed to medical care
and not social or environmental improvements.
The medicalization of death does not imply that medicine is the only fac-
tor inﬂuencing mortality. For several important causes of death, income
12 David A. Wiseimprovements and social programs have had and continue to have a large
impact on mortality. For example, Medicare likely has a direct impact on
mortality by increasing elderly access to medical care, but it also may have
important income eﬀects since it reduced out of pocket spending by the
elderly for medical care. Social security and civil rights programs may also
be important in better health. The authors do not quantify the role of med-
icine, income, social programs, and other factors in improved mortality in
the last half-century, but they do show examples where each is important
as a ﬁrst step in their ongoing research.
Mortality and Age Diﬀerences in Medical Care
Perhaps the two most important, most enduring questions in health eco-
nomics are “What are the determinants of expenditures?” and “What are
the determinants of health?” Extensive research over the last thirty-ﬁve
years has produced a variety of answers to these questions, depending in
large part on the speciﬁc context within which the questions are posed. One
crucial distinction is between explaining changes over time and explaining
cross-sectional diﬀerences at a given time. With regard to secular changes
in the United States in recent decades, most health economists now believe
that advances in medical technology provide the major explanation for
both increases in expenditures and improvements in health. With regard to
cross-sectional diﬀerences, there is less agreement. Victor R. Fuchs, Mark
McClellan, and Jonathan Skinner consider cross-sectional diﬀerences in
“Area Diﬀerences in Utilization of Medical Care and Mortality among
U.S.  Elderly.” By exploiting a rich body of data from the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services [formerly the Health Care Financing Ad-
ministration (HCFA)], the U.S. Census of Population, and other sources,
the authors hope to narrow that disagreement, at least with respect to area
diﬀerences in utilization of care and mortality of the elderly.
Their focus on the elderly is motivated in part by the fact that the elderly
account for a disproportionate share of national health care expenditures
and an even greater share of government health care expenditures. More-
over, the elderly experience the bulk of the major health problems of the
population. Approximately one-half of all deaths occur between ages
sixty-ﬁve to eighty-four, and another one-fourth occur at ages eighty-ﬁve
and above. These shares are based on the current age distribution of the
U.S. population. For a stationary population experiencing current age-
speciﬁc mortality rates, deaths at ages sixty-ﬁve to eighty-four would still
account for almost one-half the total; the share at age eighty-ﬁve and above
would rise to one-third. The focus on the elderly is facilitated by the fact
that the Medicare program generates a large, detailed body of data on uti-
lization and mortality.
One reason for focusing on area diﬀerences is that the large number of
metropolitan and nonmetropolitan areas in the United States provides a
Introduction 13convenient framework for aggregating individual data in the search for
variables that may be related to utilization and mortality. Moreover, many
health policy analysts believe that an understanding of area diﬀerences
may suggest opportunities to limit expenditures and/or improve health.
The paper has two main sections: utilization and mortality. In most mar-
kets an interest in expenditures would require attention to prices as well as
quantities, but given universal insurance coverage through Medicare and
administrative price setting by HCFA, utilization is a natural subject for
study. Mortality is only one of many possible measures of health, but there
are several reasons to concentrate on it. First, mortality is by far the most
objective measure. Secondly, it is, for most people, the most important
health outcome. Thirdly, it is probably signiﬁcantly correlated with mor-
bidity since most deaths are preceded by illness.
In this paper, Fuchs, McClellan, and Skinner focus on whites ages sixty-
ﬁve to eighty-four, or more speciﬁcally, those not identiﬁed as African
American. They exclude blacks because at those ages both utilization and
mortality of blacks are higher than for whites, and the percentage of blacks
in an area is correlated with other variables of interest. Moreover, other re-
search suggests that the relationship between those other variables and uti-
lization and mortality may be signiﬁcantly diﬀerent for blacks than for
whites. They exclude anyone aged eighty-ﬁve and over because it is more
diﬃcult to obtain accurate measures for self-reported variables, such as ed-
ucation and income. About one-half of the population aged eighty-ﬁve and
over suﬀer from some form of dementia and about one-ﬁfth are in nursing
homes where measurement of income is particularly problematic. More-
over, most nursing home utilization is not covered by Medicare, the source
of the data on utilization.
The authors ﬁnd wide variation in the utilization of health services
across regions. It is not simply that some regions are higher along all di-
mensions of care, but that in some regions there is much more diagnostic
testing, even while per capita inpatient services are comparable to the na-
tional average. In general, utilization is strongly positively associated with
mortality across areas—in other words, areas with more sick elderly use
more health care, other things being equal. There remains, however, sub-
stantial variation in utilization after controlling for factors such as educa-
tion, income, and mortality.
Cross-area variations in mortality rates among this elderly group are not
as large as variations in utilization, but they are still substantial. The 10
percent of metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) with the highest mortal-
ity (age-sex adjusted) have an average death rate 38 percent greater than
the 10 percent of MSAs with the lowest mortality. The comparable diﬀer-
ential between the high and low utilization areas is 49 percent.
Education, real income, cigarettes, obesity, air pollution, and the per-
centage of blacks account for more than half of the variation in mortality
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plained by these variables. Florida, in particular, has death rates signiﬁ-
cantly below the national average; the diﬀerential is particularly large for
areas in the southern portion of the state. The ﬁnal section of the paper ex-
plores two puzzles—why Florida is so diﬀerent from the rest of the coun-
try with respect to utilization and mortality, and why the presence of more
blacks in an area should be associated with higher mortality among elderly
whites. The authors consider several possible solutions to these puzzles, in-
cluding diﬀerential migration patterns of the elderly, but ultimately they
arrive at conjectures rather than robust explanations.
Health and Wealth—Econometric Analysis of Causal Links
In their paper “Healthy, Wealthy, and Wise? Tests for Direct Causal
Paths between Health and Socioeconomic Status.” Peter Adams, Michael
D. Hurd, Daniel McFadden, Angela Merrill, and Tiago Ribeiro test for the
absence of causal links from socioeconomic status to health and mortality,
and from health to wealth.
This paper is in large part a technical discussion of how econometrics
test for causal links. The authors use innovations in health conditions and
in wealth in the AHEAD panel to carry out tests for causality from SES to
health, and from health conditions to wealth. By advancing beyond the de-
tection of association to a framework in which there is some possibility of
detecting the absence of causal links, this paper is an advance on much of
the literature on this subject.
The authors conclude that for mortality and for accidents, the hypothe-
sis of no causal link from SES is accepted, and for incidence of mental
problems the hypothesis is rejected. The results for chronic and degenera-
tive diseases are not deﬁnitive, but using the preferred test procedure, the
hypothesis is marginally rejected in both cases. The hypothesis appears to
be accepted for acute conditions, but the necessary invariance property
fails, so the possibility that this is an artifact is not ruled out. The pattern
of results suggests that incidence of acute, sudden onset health conditions
does not exhibit a signiﬁcant SES gradient, whereas incidence of chronic,
mental, and degenerative conditions appears to have an association to SES
due to some combination of direct causal links and common unobserved
behavioral or genetic factors. Speciﬁcally, there may be an SES gradient in
seeking treatment for the second class of conditions that may inﬂuence de-
tection, or for maintaining preventative regimens that may maintain some
conditions below the reporting thresholds. Adams, Hurd, McFadden,
Merrill and Ribeiro’s ﬁndings are not inconsistent with the possibility that
for mental and chronic illnesses where the acute care procedures covered
by Medicare are often inapplicable, ability to pay may be a causal factor in
seeking and receiving treatment.
Introduction 15The technique put forth in this chapter has been applied to the Whitehall
data in the United Kingdom with results very similar to the results found
using U.S. AHEAD data. This chapter includes not only the technical pa-
per but comments from many experts in econometric analysis as well. The
authors are pursuing their line of investigation based on alternative mod-
els and using subsequent waves of AHEAD.
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